This article discusses the global-level financial constraints that shape Tunisia's foreign policy, this debtor state's international agency and the way its post-2011 authorities have managed/negotiated the issue of foreign debt both internally and internationally, including the 'odious debt' inherited from the Ben Ali dictatorship and the renewed borrowing necessities of the country. Viewed against the backdrop of the geopolitical and economic vulnerability that has driven Tunisian foreign policy throughout history, foreign debt is shown to have featured as a highly politicised issue in the domestic sphere in 2011-2012, until the February 2013 crisis enabled an increasingly technocratic government to halt the parliamentary bill calling for a debt audit and to break the taboo on new borrowing from the IMF. On the external front, a distinction is drawn between an adaptive/compliant and a resistant type of foreign policy agency, which can be observed in the international action and rhetoric on this matter deployed by Essebsi and Marzouki respectively. Adaptive/compliant foreign policy agency is technocratic and de-politicising in nature, as it attempts to isolate or blackbox domestic politics when negotiating Tunisian foreign debt abroad -while paradoxically exploiting an ideal representation of Tunisia's democratic transition (role modelling) in order to demand greater international financial support. Resistant foreign policy agency is more openly political inasmuch as its builds on post-revolutionary domestic politics and contestation. Although the latter approach bore some material fruit in the form of debt conversion measures by the country's major bilateral creditors, adaptive/compliant foreign policy agency prevailed from 2013 onwards.
IMF, taking out more than 4.65 billion dollars in loans. From the Fund's perspective, as in the 1990s, 'Tunisia again can be singled out as a "success story"' (Hecan 2016: 790) .
As part of this special issue on the 'subaltern' foreign policies of North African countries, this article focuses on the global-level financial constraints that shape Tunisia's structural place and agency on the international scene, as well as their interaction with the country's transformed, volatile and demanding domestic politics in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. The aim is thus to shed light on the political economy-foreign policy nexus, the implications of 'budget security' (Brand 1994) as an utmost foreign policy driver and, more specifically, the relationship between Tunisia's foreign debt and foreign policy agency.
Although coined by Laurie A. Brand in relation to Jordanian foreign policy, the concept of budget security, which she defined as 'ensuring sources of state revenue or reducing budgetary vulnerabilities', applies in a similar manner to Tunisia, another 'small state, regularly described as vulnerable (…)' (Brand 1994: 2) . More generally, the article seeks to speak to two strands of academic literature. The first of them is the scholarship that bridges the gap between international political economy and foreign policy analysis in order to investigate the particular features and patterns of the foreign policies of 'dependent', 'weak' or 'peripheral' states of the Global South (Moon 1985 (Moon , 1987 Hey 1995) , which is discussed in greater detail in the introduction to this special issue. The second is the literature on the international politics of foreign debt, which emphasises its inherently political and conflictual nature. Specific studies on the relationship between foreign debt and foreign policy are however quite scarce and focus largely on the implications of foreign debt for the foreign policies of creditor Western industrialised countries (e.g. Cohen 1985) , including their use of foreign lending and debt relief as foreign policy tools for pursuing their own interests (e.g. Kofas 1997 ). This has left the other side of the story, i.e. the international agency of debtor states, largely unexplored.
The central empirical question addressed here concerns specifically this debtor state agency. It asks how successive Tunisian presidents and governments over the period 2011-2016 managed and negotiated the sensitive issue of foreign debt both internally and internationally, including the 'odious debt' inherited from the Ben Ali dictatorship and the renewed borrowing necessities of their state. In other words, it will consider how the postrevolutionary authorities have navigated through the contradictory pressures and expectations stemming from the global and domestic spheres in relation to this problem -or the dilemma between acting as a poster child for the IMF and a poster child for the Arab Spring. This balancing act between domestic and foreign (economic) policy bears some of the features of two-level games as described by Robert D. Putnam (1988) as it involves the domestic ratification of international negotiations, except that the factors involved cannot all be reduced to the players' rational choices within a purely rational domestic political structure. Ideational and identity-related factors such as the widespread -and polysemic -representation of Tunisia as a role model for the region have also characterised a significant part of the engagement between the domestic and global spheres in relation to the foreign debt issue.
The article proposes a twofold argument concerning the relationship between Tunisia's domestic politics and foreign policy agency in relation to the foreign debt issue. First, a distinction is drawn between two types of foreign policy agency in this context, i.e. an adaptive/compliant agency that seeks to fulfil prevailing global expectations in conforming to neoliberal norms and practices, and a resistant agency that at least partially questions and withstands the latter. Adaptive/compliant foreign policy agency is technocratic and depoliticising in nature, as it attempts to isolate or blackbox domestic politics when negotiating Tunisian foreign debt abroad. Resistant foreign policy agency is more openly political inasmuch as its builds on post-revolutionary domestic politics and contestation. Secondly, it is contended that, after some fluctuations in 2011-2012, adaptive/compliant agency prevailed from 2013 onwards, as was demonstrated by the violation of the post-revolutionary taboo on borrowing from the IMF. The irony of this approach it that, whilst it blackboxes domestic politics, it also uses them as an asset by rhetorically exploiting the ideal notion of Tunisia's democratic transition as a 'global public good' (Essebsi 2011) in order to demand greater financial support from the international community. In general, the strategy of role modelling in exchange for resources involves an interesting trade-off between material and non-material or normative goods flowing between this country and the outside world.
In terms of methodology, the empirical study is based on an analysis of three key episodes within the foreign debt politics of post-revolutionary Tunisia, i.e. the domestic emergence of the issue of foreign debt -and the odious debt in particular -in parallel with international negotiations with the G8 in the spring of 2011, negotiations leading to the standby agreement concluded with the IMF in June 2013 and negotiations concerning the IMF's extended fund facility following up on the latter, which has been in force since June 2016. The examination of each of these episodes looks at the internal and international dimensions to the respective negotiations: on the one hand domestic political debate and contestation, including the positions and actions of the government and other state institutions, political parties and civil society; and on the other hand the discourse and 'rhetorical action' (Schimmelfennig 2000) pursued by Tunisian representatives abroad, which emphasised the role of the Tunisian transition as a regional model and the need for international material support to ensure its viability. As the aim is to capture Tunisian perspectives on these matters, the research method used has been a qualitative text analysis of over 150 press articles from online media such as Kapitalis, Tunisia Live and Nawaat, as well as press releases from the web portal of the presidency of the government and the official press agency Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP). The articles were retrieved from online archives searching using the keywords 'debt' and 'IMF', mainly in French, and were coded with the help of the software NVivo.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, the next section will offer a background to Tunisia's geopolitical and economic vulnerability as the constant driver to the country's foreign policy throughout history, placing particular emphasis on the prominent economic/economistic bias that has resulted from this. Second, the analysis will be brought up to date by discussing the domestic, regional and global constraints or sources of vulnerability that have most influenced Tunisia's foreign policy in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, ending with the debacle of the bond credit ratings of country's sovereign debt. Third, the examination of the domestic front of foreign debt negotiations will trace the rise and fall of the debate on Tunisia's foreign debt and odious debt, along with domestic politics surrounding negotiations on the IMF loans in 2013 and 2016. Fourth, the analysis of the international dimension of these negotiations will delve into the distinction between adaptive/compliant and resistant foreign policy agency, the former being illustrated by the rhetorical action of the interim Prime Minister (and later President) Beji Caid Essebsi and the latter attributed mostly to President Moncef Marzouki.
Tunisia's Vulnerability and Economy-driven Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective
(In)vulnerability or al-mana'a (immunity) (Grimaud 1995: 19) appears to be the thread that runs through all discussions of Tunisia's place in the world and foreign policy, from the 19 thCentury scramble for Africa through post-colonial state-building in the second half of the 20 th Century to the present day's post-revolutionary dilemmas. This perpetually heightened domestic concern has quite tangible geopolitical and economic roots. The first of them is 'location, location, location' (Murphy 2014: 233) , not only as a fairly exposed port country in the heart of the Mediterranean, the initial prey of invasions by all of the empires that have attempted to dominate this basin throughout history, but also and most importantly as a small state locked between two giant, oil-rich and unreliable -if now outright hostile -neighbours, Algeria and Libya. Tunisia's second structural weakness is its limited natural resource base, which has doomed it to the club of the region's 'oil have-nots' (Luciani 2013: 110) . The mainstream post-colonial Tunisian response to this two-fold vulnerability was articulated by President Habib Bourguiba (1957 in a significant foreign policy speech in October 1965 (Herreman 1965 ) as a mix of realism and liberalism. On the one hand, his acknowledgement that 'the Tunisian army (…) cannot deter or repel aggression by itself' led to the conclusion that 'it is the task of diplomacy to look for support for us among those who have an interest in backing our independence' (Grimaud 1995: 95) , meaning the great Western powers outside the region, chiefly France and the United States. On the other hand, reliance on the FrancoAmerican security patronage was combined with the belief that, on the domestic level, 'the foundations of the nation's invulnerability lie in prosperity and rising standards of living' (Grimaud 1995: 95) .
As regards President Ben Ali, it was his ability to punch above his weight on the global level and the economistic bias that underpinned it that were to become the hallmarks of his foreign policy. Put in perspective, Ben Ali's prioritisation of economic objectives in his dealings with the outside world was certainly not a massive novelty. Bourguiba had already set himself apart from his Arab counterparts by 'quickly [determining] that the economy should guide Tunisia's foreign policy' (Murphy 2014: 236) . Some of the ventures and misadventures within his relations with Maghreb neighbours were to a large extent driven by the country's economic vulnerability. Tunisian territorial ambitions in the Algerian Sahara in the 1960s were quite unabashedly motivated by greed aroused by recent oil discoveries. The appeal of an emerging oil industry and the ensuing opportunities for Tunisian migration were also behind the 'virus of the union' with the Libya of Muammar Gaddafi in the following decade (Grimaud 1995: 55, 112) . Likewise, the economy had always been central in Tunisia's constructive vision of Maghreb regional integration (Murphy 2014: 237) , another cross-cutting and consensual feature of the official foreign policy doctrine which over time took on identity and normative dimensions: 'Ben Ali (…) as a good Tunisian showed himself to be a convinced Maghrebi' (Grimaud 1995: 202) . Beyond its neighbourhood, Tunisia vied to attract European foreign direct investment since its economic opening (infitah) in the 1970, competing with Morocco to project the most ideal image of domestic political stability and to achieve the closest ties with the European Economic Community (EEC) to this end (White 2001: 167-171; Murphy 1999: 60) .
What was new in the Ben Ali era was the determination with which the Tunisian authorities adapted to the norms and practices of global neoliberal economic governance and its financial institutions. Bourguiba had resisted resorting to foreign borrowing from international markets until the late 1970s, but was swiftly drawn into a debt crisis at the beginning of the following decade (Pfeifer 1996: 44-45) . From 1982 onwards, following a similar script to other countries from the region and elsewhere, the rapid deterioration of the national financial situation led him to seek advice from the IMF and to adopt a self-imposed structural adjustment programme -although Tunisia did not yet need an IMF loan (Bessis 1987: 145) . However, the removal of subsidies for basic consumer goods then provoked such unprecedented bread riots in 1984 that the government was forced to back down. Eventually, after much hesitation, Bourguiba resigned himself to agreeing to a 250 million dollar stand-by arrangement with the IMF in 1986 after the country's foreign exchange reserves had been depleted (Bessis 1987: 146; Murphy 1999: 96-99) and its domestic political stability severely The advocates of the Tunisian debt audit put forward a mix of ethical, socio-economic and political arguments. First, they claimed that it was ethically unacceptable to expect postrevolutionary Tunisia to repay the odious part of the sovereign debt attributed to Ben Ali and his clan (Abdelhafidh 2011) . Second, this money could alternatively be used to 'tackle the social emergency, the only condition for restoring stability in the country' (Bahri 2011 (Bahri/TAP 2012) . Third, these experts reproached the advocates of debt repudiation or cancellation for irresponsibly ignoring the influence of bond credit rating agencies as a reference for lenders (Chedi 2012 ) and their ensuing impact on the country's budget security.
As lively as it was, the debate surrounding Tunisia's odious debt faded swiftly in 2013. Although these talks had already been announced in late January by Central Bank Governor Chedly Ayari, arguing that 'debt is our only way to boost the national economy' (B./TAP 2013a), it was the cabinet reshuffle that gave the green light for Tunisia's post-revolutionary taboo on borrowing from this decried international financial institution to be overcome.
Previously, the Jebali Government had been largely reluctant to accede to the IMF's usual conditions involving structural reforms, austerity measures and public spending cuts (Kausch 2013: 18) . Now an IMF delegation travelled to Tunis in order to speed up the negotiations in early April. The two main domestic political obstacles for a deal with the IMF were navigated with relative ease. The first of them were the differences on this issue between the Laarayedh Government and President Marzouki. These were downplayed and only indirectly revealed in a paper published by the Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies (ITES), a think tank affiliated with the office of the Presidency, which was highly critical of both the substance of the IMF deal and the negotiation process behind it (Dreisbach 2013d ). The second hindrance was the foreseeable opposition of a large part of the NCA. However, assurances were given that it would approve the agreement after it had been signed by the Government (Dreisbach 2013b ).
The stand-by arrangement was finally approved by the IMF's executive board in June (IMF 2013).
Domestic criticism of the 2013 IMF loan focused on three aspects, i.e. the lack of inclusiveness, transparency and public accountability of the negotiations, the deal's negative impact on Tunisia's sovereignty and its potentially harmful socio-economic consequences. The former point concerned input legitimacy while the latter two were about output legitimacy. The issue of the opacity of the negotiation process was first raised following a leak of classified documents related to Tunisia's loan request from the IMF. Observers noted significant gaps between the economic indicators (inflation rate, growth rate, budget deficit) which the Tunisian authorities had announced to domestic audiences and the figures communicated to the IMF according to the leaked documents (Bouzid 2013) . The aforementioned ITES paper questioned 'why the data provided to the IMF was much more negative than information used to craft the budget just a few months before' (Dreisbach 2013d) . This controversy was further stirred by former Central Bank Governor Nabli, who stated that 'the lack of public debate between Tunisian citizens and their government will have negative effects on the implementation of this process' (Bouzid 2013) . The input legitimacy of the process was also inadequate for members of the NCA such as Mabrouka Mbarek, who stated that 'the IMF [was] pushing for the reforms to be adopted in an undemocratic way, without any debate by the country's elected officials' (Ryan 2013). A further point of contention concerned the overly predominant role played by the non-elected Central Bank compared to the Finance Ministry (Dreisbach 2013c).
As regards sovereignty, the extent of the concern that Tunisia's economic policy would subsequently be conditioned by IMF diktats was demonstrated by Central Bank Governor Ayari's defensive insistence that 'this loan will not affect the sovereignty of the country' (B./TAP 2013b). According to both Ayari and Finance Minister Elyes Fakhfakh, the loan conditionalities discussed by the national media had not been imposed from abroad but rather involved reforms that had already been ongoing in the country since the revolution, with the IMF requirements being 'very small in comparison' (Dreisbach 2013a) . The Government went as far as to claim that it did not anticipate using the stand-by funds except in case of emergency (Dreisbach 2013b) . In terms of the socio-economic impact, many argued that IMF-sponsored reforms such as reductions in public subsidies, tax increases and higher interest rates would assuredly worsen the living standards of ordinary Tunisians, and the middle class in particular this time the sole substantial domestic contender was the labour union UGTT. In general, the UGTT blamed the government for the country's deteriorating economic situation and the rise in its foreign debt to GDP ratio to over 60% (Younes 2016) . The former Finance Minister and Union member Houcine Dimassi questioned the sustainability of Tunisia's borrowing from the IMF in terms of budget security, as 'the IMF is a rescue fund that one seeks exceptionally, not on a continuous basis' (Dahmani 2016) .
More specifically, a conspicuous two-level game was developing as a result of the clash between the IMF's requirement for the government to reduce the public wage bill, on which the release of funding tranches was made conditional, and the UGTT's unyielding demand to increase these salaries, which had been frozen since 2013 (Volkmann 2016) . This put additional pressure on the already tense relations between the government of Youssef Chahed and the UGTT, which were in parallel conducting domestic-level negotiations over public sector wages and recruitment. Some of the government's IMF-inspired economic measures brought these talks to the verge of collapse and led the UGTT to threaten to call general strike -until President
Essebsi intervened and some wage increases were agreed to (Szakal 2017) . In sum, although This sympathetic official welcome coincided with the publication of a call by 21 worldrenowned economists for the G8 to launch 'an economic plan to support the democratic transition in Tunisia' (Le Monde 2011). That was precisely the conceptual linkage that the Tunisian interim authorities wanted to strategically promote in their dealings with the international community during these hectic months. It could be summarised as money for democratic (or democratising) performance -which, interestingly, involved some trade-offs between flows of material and non-material or normative goods between this country and the outside world. In order for this rhetorical action to be most effective, it was necessary to portray
Tunisia as a role model, which required on one hand compliance with the norms underpinning the global (neo)liberal order and on the other hand some differentiation from other countries in the region. The G8 summit provided the ideal forum for this kind of modelling.
Essebsi's speech in Deauville demanding economic and financial support (25 billion dollars) for his country on this 'appointment with History' revolved around three points, i.e.
the global and regional significance of Tunisia's democratic transition, the country's exemplariness, merit and worthiness for support, and the international responsibility towards it. First, he described the Tunisian revolution as a 'global public good' and as being driven by demands that 'drew their sources from universal values, i.e. freedom, dignity and democracy' (Essebsi 2011 ; see also Présidence du Gouvernement 2011a). This allowed him to argue, echoing the terms of the economists' call, that supporting Tunisia was 'a political challenge, as a failure of the democratic transition would be a severe defeat for democracy in the world' (Essebsi 2011) . With regard to the regional level, he said that the Tunisian people had 'launched a deep democratic movement in the Arab world that could completely remodel the future of the region' (Essebsi 2011) . Second, exemplariness was presented almost as a feature of national identity: 'Tunisia has always been exemplary, including in the democratic process. We are working hard to go as fast as we can along this path' (TAP 2011c). 'Tunisia, which has been so often in the vanguard, thus revives its tradition' (Essebsi 2011) . These were the merits on which its deserving status was predicated: 'Tunisia deserves a commitment. It is putting in place a democratic process. All of the ingredients are there' (TAP 2011c). Interestingly, invocations of international responsibility were combined with a caveat about Tunisia's selfsufficiency, as the only trace of existing domestic concerns about national sovereignty: 'Tunisia can count on its own strengths. But in order to successfully complete the process it has initiated, it needs the voluntarist support of the international community (…)' (Essebsi 2011) .
Besides role modelling, the other rhetorical tool Essebsi resorted to in this context was securitisation. Although the demands and the plans mentioned in his Deauville speech were economic in nature, economic arguments as such were of secondary importance. Tunisia's overall goal of 'avoiding the phase of downturn that is often observed in democratic transitions'
was actually preceded by a reference to the security and migration-related implications (see Zardo 2017 ) of the deterioration of its economy: '[This is] an economic challenge, as it is the responsibility of the international community to avoid the vicious circle: poverty and rising unemployment leading to a surge in extremism, which in turn leads to increased poverty and unemployment as well as to the multiplication of waves of migration' (Essebsi 2011) . One last significant point concerns that which remained unsaid, or the silences within Essebsi's discourse: no mention was made of the heated domestic public debate concerning the real benefits of the financial support from the G8, the downside of Tunisia's foreign debt and the legitimacy deficit on the part of the interim government to incur further borrowing. It can therefore be argued that the price paid by Tunisia for the 40 billion dollar pledge -to be shared with Egypt -that was obtained from this G8 summit was to blackbox domestic politics and depoliticise the contentious issue of foreign debt in the highly politicised aftermath of the revolution.
One year later by contrast, the type of foreign policy agency exerted by President Marzouki in relation to Tunisia's external debt was significantly different. While reproducing much of the same role modelling discourse on Tunisia as 'probably the only [Arab Spring] country that could be a success story' (Smialek and Rastello 2014) , in terms of debt Marzouki attempted to build his foreign policy strategy on the basis of Tunisian domestic politics and questioning of the legitimacy of the odious debt as part of transitional justice, an issue that his party the CPR was particularly keen on promoting in 2012 within the institutional sphere and the NCA (Mandraud 2012) . This led him to adopt a less compliant attitude towards international financial institutions and creditors. The first sign of this turn towards pragmatic resistance was Marzouki's refusal to sign two low-profile bills concerning Tunisia's relations with the IMF -the ratification of an amendment to the articles of agreement of the IMF and an authorisation to increase Tunisia's share in this fund. In an official communiqué from his office, the President asked for the approval of these bills to be postponed until they had been examined by members of the NCA and an audit had been carried out of Tunisian foreign debt.
The arguments provided expounded the two-level game in which the Tunisian authorities were trapped in their parallel efforts to honour their international financial commitments and the post-revolutionary domestic socio-economic expectations: 'Tunisia has respected its financial and economic commitments towards the international financial institutions, even in the most difficult periods, especially after the revolution. As much as it cares about respecting international laws and conventions, it also seeks to ensure the conditions for realising the objectives of the revolution with regard to social equity and the fight against poverty and marginalisation. (…) It is to do justice to the Tunisian revolution to now carry out an audit of the debts in order to establish whether, in legal terms, they are the responsibility of the Tunisian state or the former regime (…)' (La Presse de Tunisie 2012).
In the medium term, the most significant aspect of this statement was the idea that to carry out a debt audit would enable Tunisia, 'at a later stage, to negotiate the recycling or freezing of poisoned debts in accordance with international law (…)' (La Presse de Tunisie 2012). Indeed, the foreign policy strategy into which the domestic debate on the odious debt was translated by Marzouki, especially in 2012, was to demand state/bilateral creditors to convert the Tunisian debt into development aid or investment, or at worst some debt rescheduling or a moratorium. Out of all of the options discussed in Tunisia since the revolution (Fassi 2016) , this was far from being a radical alternative such as the unilateral debt repudiation/suspension or 'beautiful bankruptcy à l'islandaise' advocated from some quarters That being said, a key implication of the findings of the article is that leaning towards adaptation/compliance in the financial sphere was to a significant extent a matter of choice on the side of the Tunisian ruling elite, and not simply the result of global structural constraints within which 'there is no alternative'. The fact that the resistant foreign policy agency pragmatically deployed by Marzouki achieved some material results, in the form of debt conversion decisions by the country's major bilateral creditors, demonstrates that there was actually some alternative to pure adaptation/compliance. It is in this room for manoeuverhowever narrow -that the international agency of debtor states resides. Rather than structural determinism or coercion, the Tunisian authorities' choice of compliance has been driven by a confluence of interests and preferences between the elites of this peripheral/debtor state and core/creditor countries -in line with Bruce E. Moon's (1985) 'dependent consensus model'.
Furthermore, this return back on track also needs to be understood in the context of a substantial restoration of Tunisia's old regime elite (Boubekeur 2016) . Still, as much as the postrevolutionary mood has been negated and the domestic politics of foreign debt blackboxed, there no way back for this internal questioning, which may at times disrupt the Tunisian authorities' strategy of role modelling in exchange for external resources.
